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KEVIN L. COPE,* CHARLES CRABTREE,** & YONATAN LUPU*** 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the last two decades, the social sciences have made impressive strides in 
understanding human rights. The law-and-social science interdisciplinary 
revolution—combined with advances in data availability, research design, and 
computational tools—have made rights an even more fruitful subject for 
academic research. While much of this new research has taken place in the social 
sciences, scholars in the humanities are increasingly studying rights as well. For 
example, historians took less interest in human rights per se until after the events 
of 9/11 and the ensuing wars in the Middle East, but many are now studying the 
origins of rights institutions, such as treaties, constitutions, and informal norms.1 
This concluding Article to the “Future of Human Rights Scholarship” special 
issue outlines how political scientists could draw on developments in law and 
insights from history to take up a set of thus-far under-explored questions. While 
political science has made important advances in studying human rights, the 
field’s focus has been rather narrow. The bulk of human rights scholarship—
especially recent empirical scholarship—has focused on respect for physical 
integrity rights: government-imposed torture, extrajudicial killing, unjust 
imprisonment, and other violations of bodily integrity.2 
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DISSENT AND REPRESSION UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (forthcoming 2019); OONA 
A. HATHAWAY, DO HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES MAKE A DIFFERENCE? (2002); Courtenay R. Conrad
& Will H. Moore, What Stops the Torture?, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 459 (2010); Courtenay R. Conrad & Emily
Hencken Ritter, Treaties, Tenure, and Torture: The Conflicting Domestic Effects of International Law, 75
J. POL. 397 (2013); Christian Davenport & David A. Armstrong, II, Democracy and the Violation of
Human Rights: A Statistical Analysis from 1976 to 1996, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 538 (2004); Emilie M. Hafner 
Burton & Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of Empty Promises, 110 
AM. J. SOC. 1373 (2005); Daniel W. Hill Jr., Democracy and the Concept of Personal Integrity Rights, 78
J. POL. 822 (2016); Yonatan Lupu, The Informative Power of Treaty Commitment: Using the Spatial
Model to Address Selection Effects, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 912 (2013); Yonatan Lupu, Legislative Veto
Players and the Effects of International Human Rights Agreements, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 578 (2015); Emily
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This disproportionate interest in physical integrity rights mirrors 
international and comparative political scholarship’s broad emphasis on conflict, 
such as atrocities, civil wars, and other forms of political violence.3 These topics 
have overshadowed the small but growing research on what political scientists 
sometimes call “empowerment rights.”4 Empowerment rights prohibit non-
violent government repression such as censorship and surveillance,5 as well as 
suppression of assembly and association, electoral, and religious rights.6 The 
conflict- and violent-repression-related literatures have also dwarfed research on 
“social rights”7—the positive obligations of government to provide access to 
goods like healthcare, shelter, and education. 
Looking first at empowerment rights, and then at social rights, this Article 
argues that world developments over the last decade have made both rights 
especially salient topics for social science research. Those interested in rights and 
repression should dedicate some of their agendas to the protection and violation 
of empowerment rights like voting, free speech, and association, and to why 
governments succeed or fail in delivering social rights like healthcare, food, 
welfare, and housing. This Article also explains why these questions are ripe for 
academic inquiry and begins to sketch an outline for what those research agendas 
might look like. 
 
Hencken Ritter & Courtney R. Conrad, Preventing and Responding to Dissent: The Observational 
Challenges of Explaining Strategic Repression, 110 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 85 (2016); James Raymond 
Vreeland, The Effect of Political Regime on Civil War: Unpacking Anocracy, 52 J. CONFLICT RES. 401 
(2008); Geoffrey P.R. Wallace, International Law and Public Attitudes Toward Torture: An Experimental 
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715 (2014); Evgeny Finkel, The Phoenix Effect of State Repression: Jewish Resistance During the 
Holocaust, 109 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 339 (2015); Daniel W. Hill, Jr. & Zachary M. Jones, An Empirical 
Evaluation of Explanations for State Repression, 108 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 661 (2014); Zachary M. Jones 
& Yonatan Lupu, Is There More Violence in the Middle?, 62 AM. J. POL. SCI. 652 (2018). 
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 5.  See Nicholas Dietrich & Charles Crabtree, Domestic Demand for Human Rights: Free Speech 
and the Freedom–Security Trade-Off, INT’L STUD. Q. (forthcoming); Gary King, Jennifer Pan, & 
Margaret E. Roberts, How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective 
Expression, 107 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1 (2013); Charles Crabtree, Christopher J. Fariss & Holger L. Kern, 
Truth Replaced by Silence: A Field Experiment on Private Censorship in Russia (Dec. 26, 2015) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2708274. 
 6.  See BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 
DOMESTIC POLITICS (2009); Daniel W. Hill Jr., Estimating the Effects of Human Rights Treaties on State 
Behavior, 72 J. POL. 1161 (2010); Yonatan Lupu, Best Evidence: The Role of Information in Domestic 
Judicial Enforcement of International Human Rights Agreements, 67 INT’L ORG. 469 (2013); Yonatan 
Lupu, Pierre-Hugues Verdier & Mila Versteeg, The Strength of Weak Review: National Courts, 
Interpretive Canons, and Human Rights Treaties, INT’L STUD. Q. (forthcoming) (on file with author); 
Cosette D. Creamer & Beth A. Simmons, The Dynamic Impact of Periodic Review on Women’s Rights, 
81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. no. 4, 2018 at 31.  
 7.  Daniel M. Brinks, Varun Gauri & Kyle Shen, Social Rights Constitutionalism: Negotiating the 
Tension Between the Universal and the Particular, 11 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 289, 289-308 (2015); David 
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II 
PREVENTIVE REPRESSION AND EMPOWERMENT RIGHTS 
Though political science’s interest in physical integrity rights has produced 
important findings and advanced our understanding of the causes and effects of 
civil conflict and government repression, it has left other important questions 
unanswered.8 For example, this focus has diverted attention from less violent 
forms of repression, particularly restriction of empowerment rights like free-
speech and the freedom of assembly and association.9 These forms of repression 
are less visible and less violent. But evidence suggests they are increasingly 
common.10 Indeed, recent research shows that violent human rights abuses in 
general have decreased around the globe in the last 50 years.11  Some of this may 
be due to shifting norms, changes in the human rights treaty regime, or other 
trends. It could also be that governments have partially substituted non-violent 
repression for violent repression. This Part explores this possibility and what it 
means for future rights research. 
When faced with potential opposition, governments willing to respond with 
illiberal tactics have a repertoire of repression options from which to choose. 
These choices range from non-violent tactics, such as closing down printing 
presses or houses of worship, to violent ones, such as torture and disappearances. 
All of these tactics are also subject to choices of scale: a government seeking to 
suppress speech may raise the cost of postage, as in Belarus, shut down a small 
number of newspapers, as in Russia, or cut off the country’s access to the Internet, 
as in Turkey; a government that chooses violence may opt for targeted killings or 
mass atrocities. 
The option the government chooses depends on a range of factors too broad 
to review here in full, so this Part focuses on the difference between reactive 
repression and preventative repression. The most violent and most notorious 
abuses of human rights tend to occur when governments repress reactively. These 
are situations in which an organized group, such as a protest movement or an 
armed insurgency, has already mobilized to challenge the state or otherwise 
taken action against it. This type of challenge to the state can include anything 
 
 8.  See Steven C. Poe, C. Neil Tate & Linda C. Keith, Repression of the Human Right to Personal 
Integrity Revisited: A Global Cross National Study Covering the Years 1976–1993, 43 INT’L STUD. Q. 291 
(2002); David L. Richards, Alyssa Webb & Chad Clay, Respect for Physical-Integrity Rights in the Twenty-
First Century: Evaluating Poe and Tate’s Model 20 Years Later, 14 J. HUM. RTS. 291 (2015). 
 9.  Though they are dwarfed by conflict-oriented research, a few recent works have addressed 
empowerment rights. See, e.g., CENSORED: DISTRACTION AND DIVERSION INSIDE CHINA’S GREAT 
FIREWALL, MARGARET E. ROBERTS (2018); Charles Crabtree, Christopher J. Fariss & Holger L. Kern, 
What Russian Private Media Censor: New Evidence from an Audit Study (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with author); Gary King, Jennifer Phan & Margaret E. Roberts, Reverse-engineering Censorship in 
China: Randomized Experimentation and Participant Observation, 345 SCI. 891 (2014). 
 10.  Freedom in the World 2015, FREEDOM HOUSE (2015), https://freedomhouse.org/report/ 
freedom-world/freedom-world-2015#.W3I-QP5KigQ [http://perma.cc/HL6Q-H2GF] (last visited Aug. 
13, 2018). 
 11.  Christopher J. Fariss, Respect for Human Rights has Improved Over Time: Modeling the 
Changing Standard of Accountability, 108 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 297 (2014). 
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from a violent attack against the government or civilians to non-violent protests. 
The intent of repression in this context is often to demobilize, punish, and 
neutralize the opposition. In some situations, states react to mobilized dissent by 
arresting, torturing, or killing members of the dissenting group.12  In the most 
extreme cases when challengers to the state are sufficiently mobilized, the state’s 
only remaining practical options may be either stepping down from power or 
inflicting mass human rights abuses.13 
Distinct from reactive repression is the set of activities governments use to 
repress preventively.14 As the name suggests, preventive repression is intended to 
prevent challengers to the state from organizing and mobilizing in the first place. 
In that sense, it occurs at an earlier stage in contentious politics. Preventive 
repression includes a wide set of tactics such as censorship, harassment, 
surveillance, and restrictions on the freedom of movement. Preventive repression 
can also be violent; governments often arrest, torture, and kill suspected 
challengers to the state before they mobilize. In a recent example of preventive 
repression, the Chavez regime in Venezuela created a database that included 
detailed information on all Venezuelan registered voters. Although the database 
included a tremendous amount of information, the regime was able to distribute 
copies to officials around the country on a single disc.15 The regime also 
nationalized the country’s only Internet Service Provider.16 
The distinction between reactive and preventive repression is crucial to future 
rights research for at least three reasons. First, while both types of repression can 
involve physical violence, preventive repression is often less violent. It is designed 
to stop groups from organizing in the first place. To do so, the state might engage 
in broad-scale but non-violent rights violations, such as tracking or even 
preventing citizens’ information-sharing. As Dobson writes, “Rather than 
forcibly arrest members of a human rights group, today’s most effective despots 
deploy tax collectors or health inspectors to shut down dissident groups.”17 In 
Ben Ali’s Tunisia, for example, the government created an agency that provided 
Internet service but also facilitated preventive repression. All Internet traffic, 
including web access and e-mail, went through the agency, making it relatively 
easy for the government to monitor and censor traffic.18 Lukashenko similarly 
 
 12.  Will H. Moore, The Repression of Dissent: A Substitution Model of Government Coercion, 44 J. 
CONFLICT RES. 107 (2000). 
 13.  Tiberiu Dragu & Yonatan Lupu, Collective Action and Constraints on Repression at the 
Endgame, 51 COMP. POL. STUD. 1042 (2018). 
 14.  Nathan Danneman & Emily Hencken Ritter, Contagious Rebellion and Preemptive Repression, 
58 J. CONFLICT RES. 254 (2013); Tiberiu Dragu & Adam Przeworski, Preventive Repression: Two Types 
of Moral Hazard, AM. POL. SCI. REV. (forthcoming), https://robobees.seas.harvard.edu/files/pegroup/ 
files/draguprzeworski2017.pdf [http://perma.cc/W5RW-542S]. 
 15.  WILLIAM J. DOBSON, THE DICTATOR’S LEARNING CURVE: INSIDE THE GLOBAL BATTLE FOR 
DEMOCRACY (2012). 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. at 5.  
 18.  Ben Wagner, Push-Button-Autocracy in Tunisia: Analysing the Role of Internet Infrastructure, 
Institutions and International Markets in Creating a Tunisian Censorship Regime, 36 TELECOMM. POL’Y 
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controls Internet throughput in Belarus.19  To be sure, preventive repression can 
be violent—a government may assault or even kill individuals to deter others 
from taking up arms—but mass atrocities are generally the result of reactive, not 
preventive, repression. Likewise, reactive repression does not have to be violent. 
Faced with mass protests, governments sometimes respond with non-violent 
actions such as curfews and barricades. Nonetheless, while non-violent means can 
often prevent such situations from arising in the first place, these tactics are often 
not sufficient deterrents once a movement has organized. 
Second, all else equal, governments prefer to repress preventively than 
reactively. This is because once dissent has mobilized, especially in the context of 
mass protests, reactive repression is costly, risky, and potentially counter-
productive.20  After a mass protest or insurgency has begun, the government’s 
ability to retain power is at risk; the government would prefer not to reach this 
phase in the process in the first place. 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, advances in information and 
communications technology have made, and will likely continue to make, 
preventive repression less costly for governments to implement on a massive 
scale.21  The Internet in particular facilitates the use of many tools that 
governments use to prevent mass mobilization, including firewalls, content filters, 
and sophisticated digital monitoring.  The ability of governments today to control 
and monitor the flow of information has no historical precedent. As Tufecki 
writes: 
Surveillance and repression, do not operate primarily in the way that our pre-digital 
worries might have forecast. This is not necessarily Orwell’s 1984. Rather than a 
complete totalitarianism based on fear and blocking of information the newer methods 
include demonizing online mediums, and mobilizing armies of supporters or paid 
employees who muddy the online waters with misinformation, information glut, doubt, 
confusion, harassment, and distraction, making it hard for ordinary people to navigate 
the networked public sphere, and sort facts from fiction, truth from hoaxes. Many 
governments target dissidents by hacking and releasing their personal and private 
information to try to embarrass or harass them, rather than acting directly on their 
political communication.22 
One way of thinking about preventive repression and reactive repression is 
as policy substitutes. Governments often turn to reactive repression after 
preventive repression fails. If technology allows governments to use preventive 
 
484 (2012). 
 19.  Charles Crabtree, Christopher J. Fariss & Paul J. Schuler, The Presidential Election in Belarus, 
October 2015, 42 ELECTORAL STUD. 304 (2016). 
 20.  See CHARLES TILLY, FROM MOBILIZATION TO REVOLUTION (1978). 
 21.  See BRUCE J. DICKSON, THE DICTATOR’S DILEMMA: THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY’S 
STRATEGY FOR SURVIVAL (2016); EVGENY MOROZOV, THE NET DELUSION: THE DARK SIDE OF 
INTERNET FREEDOM (2012); Helen V. Milner, The Digital Divide: The Role of Political Institutions in 
Technology Diffusion, 39 COMP. POL. STUD. 176 (2006); Tiberiu Dragu & Yonatan Lupu, Does 
Technology Undermine Authoritarian Governments? (Aug. 7, 2018), http://yonatanlupu.com/Technology 
%20and%20Authoritarian%20Governments.pdf [http://perma.cc/C4UN-983W]. 
 22.  ZEYNEP TUFEKCI, TWITTER AND TEAR GAS: THE POWER AND FRAGILITY OF NETWORKED 
PROTEST xxviii (2017). 
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repression more effectively, future societies may witness massive increases in 
non-violent repression. If this repression prevents mobilized dissent, we should 
also see decreases in violent repression. This is because if future governments can 
use non-violent means to prevent protestors and insurgents from taking to the 
streets, they may have less need to resort to violent repression. We may find 
ourselves in a world where physical integrity rights appear better respected (or 
at least violated less often) for reasons that are completely independent from 
human rights norms and institutions. In fact, we may already be in that world. 
What does this mean for the future of political science rights research?  First, 
it suggests scholars should increase their focus on non-violent repression. As a 
field,23 human rights scholarship needs better theories of why and how 
governments use non-violent repression, richer concepts of the types of non-
violent repression (especially those that new technology makes possible), and 
more fine-grained data on the use of these tactics.24  Second, this raises the 
possibility that the human rights legal regime has been (or soon may be) outpaced 
by technology. Existing rules were conceived and created at a time when a given 
set of rights violations seemed plausible. Today, governments can violate rights 
in ways that activists, lawyers, and scholars in the 1960s may not have considered. 
Some of the sophisticated ways governments have of conducting preventive 
repression today may either not run afoul of the current rules or be too difficult 
to detect on an individual basis to be legally actionable.25  To what extent has the 
human rights regime become outdated?  We cannot hope to answer this difficult 
question in the short span of this essay, but we encourage scholars to consider it 
in their future research. 
III 
GLOBAL INEQUALITY AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 
Though empowerment rights have been understudied in political science, 
they have gotten far more attention than social rights. There are at least a dozen 
studies of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ (ICCPR) 
impact on rights, but just a few empirical studies to date26 that have considered 
the impact of the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR), the flagship social rights convention which was concluded over 
 
 23.  This Article uses the word “field” to mean the set of disciplines—including law, political science, 
history, and sociology—that study human rights.  
 24.  There are an increasing number of datasets that include violations of physical integrity rights at 
spatially and temporally disaggregated levels, but there are fewer similar datasets for empowerment 
rights. 
 25.  Morozov, supra note 21. 
 26.  See, e.g., M. Rodwan Abouhard et al., Do Non–Human Rights Regimes Undermine the 
Achievement of Economic and Social Rights?, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: 
EMERGING POSSIBILITIES FOR SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION (LaDawn Haglund & Robin Stryker eds., 
2015); Wade M. Cole, Strong Walk and Cheap Talk: The Effect of the International Covenant of 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights on Policies and Practices, 92  SOC. FORCES 165–94 (2013); Emilie 
Hafner-Burton & Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of Empty 
Promises, 110 AM. J. SOC. 1373 (2005).  
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50 years ago.27 
Social rights, which are qualitatively different from civil and political rights, 
are sometimes referred to as positive rights because they require the government 
to take affirmative steps to uphold them. That is, while the prohibition of torture 
requires governments to refrain from acting to make citizens worse off, i.e., 
harming them, the right to housing requires governments to act affirmatively to 
benefit citizens.28 
To be sure, countless political economy studies have measured how different 
interventions affect wealth, literacy, housing, and health, but those studies are 
often based on policies not rooted in either domestic or international rights. But 
political science has not generally treated these interventions as rooted in law, 
much less as entitlements derived from natural law, constitutions, or international 
rules. 
Why does the field typically ignore social rights? Political scientists’ lack of 
attention might mirror the reason for the relative lack of interest in 
empowerment rights. International relations scholars have taken up questions of 
human rights treaty effectiveness because they are interested in government 
repression and how to reduce it. As a result, the natural focus has been on rights 
most closely related to repression, meaning physical integrity rights. This focus 
has led them to largely ignore social rights. 
The disproportionate focus on civil and political rights is curious from an 
international law scholar’s perspective. After all, for legal scholars (especially 
outside the United States), social rights are an important component of 
international human rights law, enshrined in one of the two comprehensive 
human rights conventions, the ICESCR. Social rights stand on equal footing with 
civil and political rights in the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights, and 
they later took on binding status in the ICESCR, as Cold War divides prevented 
states from agreeing on a single, global bill of binding rights. This divide persists 
 
 27.  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 28.  This distinction between positive and negative rights is not always so bright. Social rights 
sometimes involve prohibitions on government action. For instance, the UN Committee on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights states that the ICESCR includes the duty to respect, protect, and fulfill social 
rights. Asbjørn Eide (Special Rapporteur for the Right to Food), The Right to Adequate Food as a Human 
Right: Final Report submitted by Asbjørn Eide, ¶ 112-114, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/23 (July 7, 1987). 
See also Aiofe Nolan, Addressing Economic and Social Rights Violations by Non-state Actors through the 
Role of the State: A Comparison of Regional Approaches to the ‘Obligation to Protect,’ 9 HUMAN RIGHTS 
L. REV. 225, 227 (2009). Of these three, only the obligation to fulfill entails an affirmatively duty. Comm. 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 15: The Right to Water, ¶ 25, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/2002/11 (2002), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations 
Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 105 (January 20, 2003). The 
other two—respect and protect—include negative obligations. The obligation to protect means that 
states cannot take measures that intervene with people’s enjoyment of rights, such as mass evictions from 
subsidized or low-income housing. Some even argue that cutting funding levels of social welfare programs 
violates social rights (a principle known as “non-retrogression”). Likewise, negative rights can sometimes 
entail affirmative duties, as when they require the government to protect people from rights violations 
by private citizens. See Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31, Nature of the General Legal 
Obligation on States Parties to the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, para 6 (2004).  
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to some extent; some countries with more libertarian traditions like the United 
States and Australia have ratified only the ICCPR. Yet the great majority of 
states are a party to both treaties, and the UN has declared social rights to be 
“indivisible and interdependent and interrelated” with civil and political rights.29 
For legal scholars, then, social rights enjoy equal status to civil and political rights. 
And the topic of social rights is particularly important as human rights is 
increasingly being criticized for ignoring questions of inequality.30 
For example, legal historian Samuel Moyn has recently documented how the 
human rights movement has comfortably coexisted with the neo-liberal project 
of free trade, privatization, and globalization. But Moyn argues that it has done 
relatively little to take up inequality by using and enforcing social rights. In both 
of these fields, there is a growing sense that social rights have been overlooked. 
Moyn claims that “organizations such as Amnesty International and Human 
Rights Watch … dropped the emphasis on economic and social rights proclaimed 
by the UN’s Universal Declaration and converted the idea of human rights from 
a template for citizenship into a warrant for shaming state oppressors…. The 
political and legal project of human rights became a companion to the rise of 
inequality, which paved the road to populism and further rights abuses.”31 
While there is less political science research on the effect of social rights, there 
is a robust body of legal research on social rights enforcement. This interest is not 
just academic, and its timing is not coincidence. Domestic and regional courts 
around the world, especially in Latin America, have increasingly enforced the 
ICESCR or relied on the Committee’s interpretations in issuing their judgments. 
This has led to a growing body of legal scholarship by Latin Americanists on 
domestic and regional courts’ interpretations of social rights. Social rights are also 
now enforceable at the international level. In 2013, an international enforcement 
mechanism took effect that establishes an individual complaints procedure.32 
And the Spanish Supreme Court recently ruled that the ICESCR’s 
interpretations constitute binding domestic law in that country.33 
Social rights, then, have become practically significant as international 
institutions and in domestic law, particularly in the Global South. But, as 
discussed above, there has still been little interest in the topic from political 
scientists. There are at least two reasons why social rights are now ripe for further 
study. First, political scientists are interested in treaty effectiveness, and the 
 
 29.  World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, ¶ 5, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (June 25, 1993).  
 30.  MOYN, supra note 1. 
 31.  Samuel Moyn, Human Rights Are Not Enough: We Must Also Embrace the Fight Against 
Economic Inequality, THE NATION (Mar. 16, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/human-rights-
are-not-enough/ [http://perma.cc/D4X6-P45F].  
 32.  But, like the interpretations of the HRC of the ICCPR, these are not legally binding. Laurence 
R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE 
L. J. 273 (1997). 
 33.  Koldo Casla, Supreme Court of Spain: UN Treaty Body individual decisions are legally binding, 
EJIL: TALK! (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.ejiltalk.org/supreme-court-of-spain-un-treaty-body-individual-
decisions-are-legally-binding [http://perma.cc/MQ7Q-DU7D]. 
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ICESCR represents a potentially important treaty. The literature on treaty 
effectiveness has been dominated by studies of treaties concerned primarily with 
negative rights—the Convention Against Torture (CAT), the ICCPR, and the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The studies reach 
mixed results, but many find that the treaties exert a statistically significant but 
substantively moderate positive effect, often conditional on the presence of 
certain domestic political or legal institutions.34 But there is some evidence that 
treaties’ effect is different for positive rights than for negative rights.35 If the 
conclusions from the treaty-effectiveness literature are biased by oversampling 
of negative-rights treaties, more focus on treaties like ICESCR and the positive 
rights in CEDAW, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the 
Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) 
would help to correct that bias. 
Second, political scientists are interested in the spread of national populism 
around the world. Some evidence suggests that income inequality has largely 
fueled these movements. As Moyn claims, “Today’s galloping inequality has 
helped drive the rise of populist leaders, who have hardly been friends of human 
rights.”36 Indeed, populist parties are often successful in advocating for rollbacks 
in empowerment rights. This means that by studying state provisions of social 
rights, researchers can also better understand the causes of empowerment rights 
violations. 
It is not an issue of measurement. Indeed, one potential benefit of studying 
socioeconomic rights is that these rights are often easy to operationalize. Since 
the ICESCR is focused on governments’ dedicating resources towards social 
rights, social spending measures offer a reasonable way to examine variation in 
these rights. One recent empirical study uses data on government spending on 
healthcare and education (as a percentage of GPD and as a percentage of total 
government spending) to gauge the impact of social rights in constitutions.37 
While spending does not guarantee full realization of social rights, it captures 
government efforts to make progress on realizing these rights. Other plausible, 
easily available indicators of social rights—literacy rates and mortality rates—
better capture actual realization. 
Social rights measures may even have some advantages over empowerment 
and physical integrity rights measures. Negative rights do not always have a clear 
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link between the right and the observable indicator. Proof of this lies in the 
panoply of different indicators for some single underlying construct, such as 
torture or democracy.38 Another potential benefit is that for many socioeconomic 
rights it is relatively easy to collect data on the defined measure.39 In contrast, 
data on negative rights like extrajudicial killings and torture is often considerably 
more difficult to collect, as governments do not compile systematic records of 
these abuses.40 Indeed, states have powerful legal, political, and financial 
incentives to conceal violations of many rights.41 Many measures require time- 
and resource-intensive interpretation of detailed NGO and agency reports. So 
lack of measures are not a serious barrier to empirical research on social rights. 
In many cases, social rights data are publicly available in the World Bank 
Indicators database.42 In other cases, this data can be collected from national and 
subnational administrative records.43 
There are some important caveats. Though data on socioeconomic rights is 
easier to collect, researchers should understand that this data also might be 
biased in important ways. Social expenditure data is collected and provided by 
the state. We know, though, that decisions about the production and release of 
state data are often politically informed. States have strategic incentives to 
release biased statistics.44 In some cases, states might artificially inflate official 
statistics, such as GDP and emigration, to limit regime opposition.45 In other 
cases, states might artificially deflate official statistics, such as economic and 
population numbers, to qualify for foreign aid or other types of international 
assistance.46 Understanding whether these biases also influence official statistics 
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about social spending is an important area for future research. 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
Scholars of history and politics have documented a shift in how authoritarians 
operate. Increasingly, they take and keep power through nominally democratic 
institutions. Though coups d’etat and brute violence dominate the history of 
autocracies, today’s autocrats are more likely to seek office through (ostensibly) 
democratic elections and, once in power, to retain it through subtler forms of 
repression. But ironically, one part of the authoritarian strategy is to promise—
and sometimes to successfully deliver—more social rights: in the form of welfare, 
housing, and healthcare. Notably, nationalist leaders often succeed by promising 
these benefits to some groups—natives, and religious or ethnic majority groups—
and denying them to others—migrants, and religious or ethnic minority groups. 
A study of regimes focused narrowly on torture, disappearances, and 
extrajudicial killings would therefore miss much of the story behind many 
modern autocracies. 
This story shows why political scientists might wish to look beyond physical 
integrity rights and consider a broader range of civil, political rights, and social 
rights. These rights represent the future of global law and politics, and—we 
hope—of social science rights research. 
 
